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NOTES
TRUST DEVICES PREVENTING ALIENATION OF THE
BENEFICIARY'S EQUITABLE INTEREST
Generally speaking, for every legal interest that can be created in personalty
or realty, a corresponding equitable interest can be created.' However, there are
certain equitable interests which can be created for a trust beneficiary but which
cannot be created as corresponding legal interests. The distinction lies in the fact
that restraints on alienation are valid if attached to certain equitable interests, but
are invalid if attached to corresponding legal interests. The trust devices which
give rise to the inalienability of certain equitable interests will be set forth herein.
However, to fully appreciate the significance of these special trust devices, it is
first advisable to consider the attributes of equitable interests under an ordinary
trust. Whether the equitable interest of the beneficiary of a trust is a property
right, which the beneficiary holds as an equitable owner of the trust property, or
merely a personal right, which the beneficiary holds as a claimant against the
trustee to have the trust carried out, has been the subject of much controversy.
Although the beneficiary's interest was originally treated as a personal right
against the trustee, it has become increasingly recognized in many jurisdictions as
a property right, the beneficiary also retaining his personal claim against the
trustee.2  Section 130 of the'Restatement of Trusts defines the nature of the
beneficiary's interest as "personal property" if the trust property is personal
property, and as "real property" if the trust property is real property unless the
interest of the beneficiary is so limited in duration that if it were a legal interest
it would be personal property. Pennsylvania is in accord with the latter realistic
view that the equitable interest of the beneficiary of a trust is personal or real
property, depending on the nature of the trust property,3 and the interest also in-
cludes a personal right against the trustee. Although case terminology is by no
means conclusive it is interesting to note that in Fowler v. Fidelity Co.4 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court labeled the beneficiary's interest in the income from a
trust estate consisting of corporation bonds as an "equitable estate for life."
11 Bogert on Trusts (1935), Sec. 181.
21 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 183.
IFoulke, Rules Against Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienation and Restraints on Enjoyment in
Pennsylvania (1909), Sec. 161.
4125 Pa. 338, 393 (1889).
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In McCullough v. Seitz, 5 where land was conveyed to a trustee to pay the income
to the beneficiary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court designated the beneficiary's
interest as "an equitable estate in land." In Commonwealth v. Stewart' the
Supreme Court defined the beneficiary's interest as, " . . . in addition to rights
against the trustee, the beneficiary also has rights in rem, an actual property inter-
est in the subject matter of the trust, an equitable ownership of the trust res." This
is also the view adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
7
Therefore, in view of the property nature of the beneficiary's interest, in the
absence of provisions in the trust instrument or statutes to the contrary, the bene-
ficiary can alienate his equitable interest as freely as he could a legal interest. 8 By
the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts the beneficiary's interest in assignable,"
devisable, 10 descends according to intestate law," and is subject to involuntary
alienation by creditors to the same extent as a corresponding legal interest. 12 In
Inlow v. Christy'3 the Supreme Court described the beneficiary's interest as, ...
the subject of contract, conveyance and seizure on execution, the same as the legal
title."
Thus, it can be stated as a general rule that, except for those certain types
of trusts which prevent alienation of the beneficiary's interest and which will be set
forth herein, the beneficiary can transfer his interest or his creditors can by appro-
priate proceedings reach his interest and thereby subject it to the satisfaction of
their claims against him. 14 Th- creditors can, of course, reach only the equitable
interest of the debtor. For example, where the debtor is the life beneficiary of an
income from the trust estate, the principal of the trust estate being a gift over to
a third person on the life beneficiary's death, a creditor of the beneficiary can
reach only the income and not the principal of the trust.' 5  However, if the
beneficiary's interest is such that he is entitled to a share of the principal of the
trust estate, his creditor can reach the principal to the extent of the beneficiary's
interest.16 In many jurisdictions the creditor must go into equity to have the bene-
ficiary's interest applied to the satisfaction of the debt, and in som'e jurisdictions
the equitable remedy is the only form of relief. 17 However, the normal remedy
in Pennsylvania is by txecution at law whereby the creditor who has obtained
z judgment against the beneficiary has an attachment execution issued thereon,
528 Pa. Super. 458, 465 (1905).
6338 Pa. 9, 14 (1940).
7Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589, 35 S. Ct. 154 (1915); Blair v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 300 U. S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330 (1936).
8Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 132, 133.
9Phillip's Estate (No. 3), 205 Pa. 515 (1903).
IOWilhelm v. Folmer, 6 Pa. 294 (1847).
Illbid; Wylie v. Mansley, 132 Pa. 65 (1890).
12McCurdy v. Bellefonte Trust Co., 292 Pa. 407 (1928).
13187 Pa. 186, 192 (1898).
1
4
Restatement of Trusts, Sees. 132, 133, 147.
1
5
Osborne v. Soley, 81* Pa. 312 (1876) ; Egbert v. de Solms, 218 Pa. 207 (1907.
1
6
Trask v. Shaffer, 140 Pa. Super. 505 (1940).
'7lBogert, op. cit., Sec. 193.
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naming the trustee as garnishee.18 It has been held that a creditor of the income-
beneficiary of a trust can attach the income and receive from the trustee what the
beneficiary would otherwise be entitled to receive;19 that where the beneficiary's
income from the trust is to begin after the death of a third person beneficiary, the
beneficiary's interest in the future income can be attached by his creditor, although
nothing will be realized on it by payments from the trustee until the third person
beneficiary dies; 2° that where the beneficiary is entitled to payments of principal
from the trust estate his creditor can attach principal payments held for the
ben'eficiary by the trustee;21 that where the beneficiary holds a vested interest of
trust income or principal in remainder, the court may direct a seizure and sale or
mortgage of his interest to satisfy a creditor's claim.
22
From the above discussion it is evident that an equitable interest is as freely
alienable, as a corresponding legal interest, with particular emphasis on the fact
that such equitable interest can be involuntarily alienated by creditors of the
beneficiary. This concept of freedom of alienation is an application of the general
policy of the English and American common law forbidding restraints on alien-
ation of interests in personality or realty, premised on the idea that freedom of
transfer is essential to a healthy society and that creditors should have access to
whatever their debtors may own. 23  In Overmans Appeal24 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court speaks of the " . . . general policy which forbids restraints on
alienation and the non-payment of honest debts." Although this general policy
is vigorously applied by the courts to absolute legal interests, 2s and to legal life in-
terests2 6 with few exceptions, it is interesting and startling to observe that certain
trust devices which restrain freedom of alienation of the equitable interest can be
created, and that such trust devices will be held valid by the courts. This result
is accomplished by the settlor (creator) of the trust either by expressing in the
terms of the trust instrument an intention that th- equitable interest shall not be
alienable or an intention to create a certain type of trust the very nature and pur-
pose of which would be defeated if the equitable interest were alienable. These
trust devices which prevent alienation of the equitable interest will be discussed
in the light of Pennsylvania law in thL following order: (1) Spendthrift Trust,
(2) Partial Spendthrift Trust, (3) Support Trust, (4) Discretionary Trust, (5)
Sole and Separate Use Trust, (6) Blended Trust, (7) Other Possible Trusts.




Girard Life Insurance and Trust Co. v. Chambers, 46 Pa. 485 (1864).
20Riverside Trust Co. v. Twitchell, 342 Pa. 558 (1941).
21See note 16.2 2
Jones v. Jones, 344 Pa. 310 (1942).
231 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 220; Foulke, op. cit., Secs. 11 & 12.
2482 Pa. 276, 281, (1878).




The typical spendthrift trust is one which by the terms of the trust the bene-
ficiary's interest in the income from the trust property for life or for a term of
years is not transferable by him and is not subject to claims of his creditors, i.e.,
there is a provision restraining voluntary and involuntary alienation of the equit-
able interest. 27 In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "A spendthrift
trust . . . exists where there is an express provision forbidding anticipatory alien-
ations, and attachment by creditors." 28
The spendthrift trust is said to have been originated in Pennsylvania by dictum
in Fisher v. Taylor (1829).29 In that case the testator directed his executors to
purchase a tract of land to be conveyed to them in trust for his son who was to
have the rents, issues, and profits, but the same were not to be liable for any
debts contracted or which might be contracted by his son, at whose death the land
was to vest in the heirs of his body, but if he should die without heirs of his body
then to vest in the right heirs of the testator. The Supreme Court held that the son
did not have such an interest in the land as could be taken on execution and sold for
his debts, and found that the testator, "manifestly designed to secure to his son,
I the enjoyment of the rents, issues, and profits of the land, during his life, in
such a manner that they should not be subject to be sold for the payment of his
debts, and he constituted his executors special trustees to carry that intention into
effect." Justifying this viewpoint, the Court said, "A man may, undoubtedly, so
dispose of his land, as to secure to the object of his bounty, and to him exclusively,
the annual profits ...Nor is such a provision contrary to the policy of the law,
or to any act of assembly."
The Pennsylvania courts and the courts of other jurisdictions seized upon
Fisher v. Taylor, supra, as the foundation for validation of the spendthrift trust
device. The courts justify the spendthrift trust on the theory that the owner of
property has a right to dispose of his property as he pleases. Consequently, the
spendthrift trust has become well entrenched in decisional law of Pennsylvania.
In Overman's Appeal (1878)10 the Court gave full recognition to this unique
device by the following words:
"That a trust for a spendthrift, as it is termed, will be upheld in equity,
is a settled doctrine of this state, and rests on the donor's right of domin-
ion over his own property for a reasonable time. But it is exceptional in
its very nature, because it contravenes that general policy, which forbids
restraints on alienation and the non-payment of honest debts. In order to
support it resort is had to a trust, which equity will enforce, and equity
necessarily regards its reasonableness and the clearly defined intent of the
donor."
2 7
Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 152; 1 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 222.2 8
Keeler's Estate. 334 Pa. 225, 229 (1939).




An examination of spendthrift trust cases in Pennsylvania discloses that
specific words need not be employed by the settlor in the terms of the trust instru-
ment in order to create a spendthrift trust so long as the terms manifest, express-
ly or impliedly, an intention of a prohibition against voluntary and involuntary
alienation of the beneficiary's interest. The courts have been liberal in finding
an intention to create a spendthrift trust by very slight language in the trust instru-
ment. 81
In the early Pennsylvania cases the courts were strict in the requirement that an
intention to create a spendthrift trust had to be manifested within the trust instru-
ment.32 However, a departure from this strict requirement occurred in 1890
in Stambaugh's Estate88 when the Supreme Court went outside of the trust instru-
ment, which lacked the usual provisions for creation of a spendthrift trust, and
inquired into the surrounding circumstances to find that a spendthrift trust was the
object of the testator, the main circumstance being the insolvency of the bene-
ficiary at the time the trust was created. However, in later cases,8 4 particularly
in McCurdy v. Bellefonte Trust Co. (1928)88 and Trask v. Shaffer (1940),3'
the Court denied admission of similar extrinsic evidence. The effect of these
later cases was an over-ruling of the Stambaugh case, and a clear enunciation of
the requirement that a trust will not be construed a spendthrift type unless the
language of the trust instrument warrants that consruction.
The Pennsylvania cases illustrate that to be a valid spendthrift trust the bene-
ficiary need not be a "spendthrift" or lack any particular capacity, but may be a
legally competent person able to manage his own affairs. Also, a Spendthrift
trust may be created by will or inter vivos transaction and may consist of real or
personal property or a combination of both, there being no limit on the size of
the beneficiary's interest.
Inasmuch as the settlor's purpose in creating a spendthrift trust is to prevent
the beneficiary's interest from passing to another person either by transfer or by
S
1
In Vaux v. Parke, 7 Watts and Sergeant 19 (1844), the will provided for payment "into the
proper hands" of the son. Held, a spendthrift trust. In Shower's Estate, 211 Pa. 297 (1905), the
will provided for the "trustee so to control the shares of my three above-named children and the
investments thereof that they, my sons and my daughters may enjoy the interest thereof . Held,
a spendthrift trust.3 2Girard v. Chambers, 46 Pa. 485 (1864).
88135 Pa. 585 (1890). The court said at 597: "It is said, however, that we must search only
for the intent of tie testator withii the four corners of the will. This is true, but, when we come
to consider the will and interpret its meaning, we must do so in the light of all the circumstances
by which the testator was surrounded when he made it, and by which he was probably influenced."
3
4
1n re Shoup's Estate, 31 Pa. Super. 162 (1906); Butler County Nat'). Bank v. MacMullen,
292 Pa. 556 (1928).
35292 Pa. 407 (1928).
36140 Pa. Super. 505 (1940). The court said at 509-10: "A rule of excessive liberality in
favor of a spendthrift trust was applied in Stambaugh's Estate. . In McCurdy v. Bellefonte Trust
Co., supra, however, the Supreme Court referred to Stambaugh's Estate as an 'extreme case', re-
pudiated its doctrine and arrested the trend in the direction of liberality, retraced its steps and es-
tablished the applicable rule firmly on conservative grounds. . . That case (Stambaugh's Estate)
is no longer a reliable authority in Pennsylvania."
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attachment of creditors, such purpose can be accomplished. 37  However, the
tendency is to create exceptions, by judicial decisions and statutes, in favor of
creditors having claims with a high equity. The most important exception is the
claim for support and maintenance of the wife and children of the -husband-
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. This exception did not prevail until recently,
however. Although a duty was imposed on a husband to support his wife and
children by the Support Act of 1867, the turn of the century found a wife who
obtained a support order unable to attach the income of a husband-beneficiary of
a spendthrift trust.38 However, by statutes enacted in 191739 and 1921,40 and by
court decisions over-ruling prior case law, 41 a spendthrift trust is now treated as
an ordinary trust in so far as claims of support for the wife and children against
the husband-beneficiary are concerned. Tbe reasons for this exception were ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Lippencott v. Lippencott (1944):42 "The Com-
monwealth is vitally interested not only in the moral and social factors, but also
in preventing wives from becoming public charges." In addition, other claim-
ants who have been excepted from the general rule and allowed to reach the bene-
ficiary's interest have been the Commonwealth-for support furnished to the
beneficiary, 48 the trustee-for expenses incurred for the aid of the beneficiary"4
and for advances of income to the beneficiary,4 5 and the settlor-for debts owed
to him by the beneficiary.
46
It has also been clearly established that if the settlor attempts to create a
spendthrift trust for his own benefit the restraint against alienation of the equit-
able interest will be held invalid, and his creditors can reach his interest. 47 The
reason for this ruling is that a person cannot settle his property for his o1wn use in
such a manner as to enjoy all the benefits and share none of the burdens.
A review of the cases on spendthrift trusts discloses that the Pennsylvania
courts have been liberal in validating this device, and although the device as
outlined above is the typical spendthrift trust, many variations thereof have been
held to be spendthrift trusts by the courts. Also, particularly in the early cases,
the label spendthrift trust has sometimes been applied to what are actually support
or discretionary trusts, possibly because all three devices result in a restraint
against alienation of the equitable interest. But some trust instruments do com-
bine the language of the spendthrift trust with that of the support or discretionary
3 7
Seitzinger's Estate, 170 Pa. 500 (1895); Thackara v. Mentzer, 100 Pa. 151 (1882).
38Board of Charities v. Lockard, 198 Pa. 572 (1901).
3 9
The Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, Sec. 19 (20 PS 243).
4OAct of May 10, 1921, P. L. 434, Sec. 1 (48 PS 136).
4 1
Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 578 (1934).
42349 Pa. 501, 504 (1944). For a thorough discussion of support claims of the wife of the
husband-beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, see 51 Dick. LR (1946) 1.4 3Walters' Case, 278 Pa. 421 (1924).44 1n re Thaw's Estate, 252 Pa. 99 (1916).
45King's Estate, 147 Pa. 410 (1892).
46Neel's Estate (No. 1), 207 Pa. 443 (1904).4 7Philadelphia v. Meredith, 49 Pa. Super. 600 (1912); Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135 (1907);
Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 156 (1).
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trust. 48 However, since the nature, operation, and purposes of the support and
discretionary trusts are different from the spendthrift trust, they should be under-
stood to be and treated as three distinct trust devices. 49
PARTIAL SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
A partial spendthrift trust may be defined as a trust which by its terms a
restraint is imposed against voluntary alienation or against involuntary alienation of
the beneficiary's interest, i.e., only one of the two restraints essential to. a complete
spendthrift trust is provided for by the settlor 50
The Pennsylvania cases involving this problem are few in number and the
results are not conclusive.
First, if the settlor provides in the trust instrument for a restraint against in-
voluntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest by his creditors, but makes no
mention of a restraint against voluntary alienation by the beneficary, it would
seem by analogy of cases of testamentary devises and bequests wherein such
singular provision was included that the beneficiary's creditors should not be
able to reach his equitable interest. 51 There is also the possibility that where the
trust terms provide for a restraint against involuntary alienation but make no
mention of a restraint against voluntary alienation the court will imply the
latter restraint, resulting in a complete spendthrift trust. Such a result was arrived
at in Shankland's Appeal.52 However, if the trust terms provide for a restraint
against involuntary alienation but expressly permit voluntary alienation, the cases
indicate that the singular restraint would be held invalid, resulting in an ordinary
trust wherein the beneficiary's interest could be reached by his creditors and
transferred by the beneficiary.53
Second, if the settlor provides in tle trust instrument for a restraint against
voluntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest, but makes no mention of a
restraint against involuntary alienation, it would seem that the prohibition against
voluntary transfer should be enforced. Since a complete spendthrift trust is
valid in Pennsylvania, the greater should justify the lesser restraint, and since a
restraint against voluntary transfer is less harmful to third persons dealing with
the beneficiary than a restraint against attachment of the equitable interest by
creditors, the singular restraint against voluntary alienation should be held valid.
There is also the possibility that where the trust terms provide for a restraint
4 8
Huber's Appeal, 80 Pa. 348 (1876); Hibb's Estate, 143 Pa. 217 (1891).49
For discussions of spendthrift trusts in Pennsylvania, see 36 Dick. LR (1931) 45, and 5 Tem-
ple LQ (1931) 626.
501 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 222.
5 1
See the following cases: Holmesburg Building Association v. Badger et Ux., 144 Pa. Super.
65 (1941); Goe's Estate, 146 Pa. 431 (1892); Berk's Estate, 133 Pa. 51 (1890).
5247 Pa. 113 (1864). Also see Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 152, Comment e.
53Keyser's Appeal, 57 Pa. 236 (1868); Morgan's Estate (No. 1), 223 Pa. 228 (1909).
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against voluntary alienation but make no mention of a restraint against involun-
tary alienation the court might imply the latter restraint, resulting in a complete
spendthrift trust. Winthrop ro. v. Clinton54 has frequently been cited by writels
as supporting this view, but a close examination of the case will disclose that the
Court found that the settlor intended a spendthrift trust, as evidenced by the terms
of the will and all the surrounding circumstances, citing Stambaugh's Estate, supra.
Thus, the Winthrop case is not a reliable authority for the last proposition. Con-
tinuing, if the trust terms provide for a restraint against voluntary alienation but
expressly permit involuntary alienation, it can be strongly argued that such a
singular restraint should be held valid on the same theory as discussed above where
the trust terms provide for a restraint against voluntary alienation but make no
mention of involuntary alienation.
The same exceptions as to claims of creditors with a high equity applicable to
complete spendthrift trusts should also apply to any of the above mentioned
variations of the partial spendthrift trust in which a restraint against involuntary
alienation is held to be valid.
Inasmuch as the cases involving partial spendthrift trusts are few in number
and inconclusive in results, it is obviously advisable for a settlor to create a com-
plete spendthrift trust rather than chance an invalidation by the courts of a singular
restraint under a partial spendthrift trust. 5
SUPPORT TRUST
The trust for support is a trust which by its terms provides that the trustee
shall pay or apply only so much of the income and principal or either as is neces-
sary for the support or education of the beneficiary, with the result that the bene-
ficiary cannot transfer his interest and creditors cannot reach it.56
Although some of the cases, particularly the earlier cases, combine the lan-
guage of trusts for support with that of spendthrift and/or discretionary trusts, 7
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Keeler's Estate (1939),11 distinguished
the support trust as a separate device by the following words:
"The present trust is a so-called 'trust for support,' and, although
sometimes loosely referred to as a spendthrift trust, differs from it in
essential features which must not be overlooked if confusion as to its
legal attributes and qualities is to be avoided. In a trust for support
54196 Pa. 472 (1900). The testator provided for income to his son "for his use and support
for and during all the term of his natural life, and not to be liable to anticipation, and his receipt
alone to be the sole discharge" to the trustees. The court considered the will and surrounding
circumstances. Held a spendthrift trust. Also see Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 152, Comment d.
55
For discussion of partial spendthrift trusts see 50 Dick. LR (1946) 79, and 81 Univ. of
Pa. LR (1933) 480.5 6
Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 154; Keeler's Estate, 334 Pa. 225 (1939).
5 7
Huber's Appeal, 80 Pa. 348 (1876).
58334 Pa. 225, 229-30 (1939).
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the limitation of the power of alienation arises only by implication
from the nature of the beneficiary's interest and the indicated purpose
of the trust ... The purpose of this type of trust being to furnish to the
beneficiary the means necessary for his p'ersonal subsistence, education
and physical comfort, that object might be frustrated if the income were
to be dissipated among creditors or anticipated by the beneficiary. If,
therefore, an assignment of the beneficiary's interest would be in-
compatible with the purpose of the trust by diverting the income from
the use stipulated by the testator, the court will, in order to enforce his
dispositive intent, prevent such diversion even though there be in the
trust instrument no express restriction on alienation. While, therefore,
in a spendthrift trust the interdiction against alienation, voluntary or
involuntary, is express and absolute, and will be enforced accordingly,
in the case of a trust for support the law implies and enforces restrictions
only to the extent necessary to consummate the purpose of the testator."
Thus, the restraints against alienation are implied by law to the extent
necessary to provide for support and education of the beneficiary as was in-
tended by the settlor by the terms of the trust instrument. Since the trustee, and
not the beneficiary, pays over or applies such amounts as are necessary to accom-
plish the purpose of the trust for support, any benefits awarded to a person other
than the person designated as beneficiary by the settlor would defeat the purpose
of the trust. Consequently, the cases hold that tht beneficiary's interest cannot
be assigned by him,"9 nor can it be attached by his creditors. 60
DISCRETIONARY TRUST
A discretionary trust is a trust which by its terms provides that the trustee
shall pay to or apply for the beneficiary only so much of the income or principal
as the trustee in his absolute and uncontrolled discretion shall see fit to pay or
apply, with the result that a transferee or creditor of the beneficiary cannot com-
pel payments of any part of the income or principal by the trustee.
61
Here again the language of the discretionary trust is oftimes combined with
the language of spendthrift and support trusts. 62  Frequently the result is a
spendthrift trust because of an express provision against alienation, in addition
to the provision vesting discretionary powers in the trustees.63  However, the
discretionary trust is a device of a separate nature and can withstand the assault
of creditors of the beneficiary without the aid of spendthrift provisions. In
Keyser v. Mitchell (1871)64 the Court explained the nature of the discretionary
trust by the following words:
5
9
Appeal of Forcey v. Mitchell, 106 Pa. 508 (1884).
60Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts 547 (1836).
6
1Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 155 (1); 1 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 226,
62
Barker's Estate, 159 Pa. 518 (1894).
6SHibb's Estate, 143 Pa. 217 (1891).
6467 Pa. 473, 477 (1871).
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"But here nothing is given to the cestui que trust [beneficiary], except-
ing at the discretion of the trustee. It was no doubt intended by the
testator that a comfortable maintenance should be provided from the
trust estate for her son; but that was to be both in the amount and mode,Iat the sole and absolute discretion of the trustee.' This is an express
condition of trust, and until that discretion has been exercised the cestui
que trust has nothing... In such case, chancery will not interfere to con-
trol the trustee's discretion: . . . To subject the income to exetution of a
creditor, would end all discretion of the trustee over the income, and
in effect, utterly defeat the intent of the testator in creating it. We
cannot but regard this form of trust to be as effectual in guarding a
trust and its income against the prodigality of its beneficiary, as would
be a positive exclusion of creditos in the will of the donor. Where the
amount results from the discretion of the trustee, and that discretion is
personal, no sum, eo nomine, exists to be attached: It only belongs
to the cestui que trust when it is paid, or in some other way made over,
or set apart to him."
In effect, the beneficiary has a mere expectancy and cannot compel the
trustee to make payments to him, 6 5 so that a transferee or creditor of the bene-
ficiary stands in no better position than the beneficiary. Thius, it is the very
nature of the discretionary trust that prevents the beneficiary's transferee or credi-
tor from compelling a payment of income or principal by the trustee.6
SOLE AND SEPARATE USE TRUST
A sole and separate use trust is a trust which by its terms provides that the
benefits are for the sole and separate use of a married woman, free from control
or interference by her husband, with the result that the beneficiary's interest
cannot be transferred nor can it be reached by creditors of the beneficiary or her
husband unless such power of alienation is authorized by the settlor in the terms
of the trust.
67
Under the rules of common law the married woman had serious legal dis-
abilities. She lacked power to take and hold property and had no separate power
to contract and convey. Her ownership of personalty and realty at marriage was
merged with that of her husband, who exercised ownership and control thereafter.
As a result the sole and separate use trust was devised to permit her to enjoy
the benefits of property free from her husband's interference and control, the
trustee being a third person or frequently her husband. 68
Notwithstanding the enactment of the Married Women Property Acts, placing
a married woman on virtually the same footing as a single woman concerning inde-
pendent contractual and property rights, the sole and separate use trust has con-
65
Spring's Estate, 216 Pa. 529 (1907).66
See note 64; Kelley's Estate (No. 1), 253 Pa. 466 (1916).6 7
-olliday v. Hively, 198 Pa. 335 (1901); McConnel v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 447 (1890).
682 Bogert on Trusts (1935), Sec. 234.
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tinued in use in Pennsylvania. The courts have held that these Acts neither
invalidated the creation nior affect the operation of the sole and separate use
trust.6 9
A settlor can create a sole and separate use trust only if the beneficiary is a
married woman or if such trust is created in contemplation of an immediate mar-
riage of the woman beneficiary.7 0 The normal method of creating such a trust
is by provision in the trust terms that the property is for the sole and separate
use of a particular married woman without interference or control by her hus-
band. 71 The result is a sole and separate use trust, the very nature and purpose
of which would be defeated if the beneficiary's interest were alienable. Therefore,
neither the married woman beneficiary nor her husband can transfer nor can his
or her creditors attach her interest unless the terms of the trust expressly authorize
such powers of alienation.72 In Holliday v. Hively 3 the Court quotes Chief Jus-
tice Gibson from an earlier case, as follows:
"We therefore hold it to be thei settled law of Pennsylvania that, instead
of her having every power for which she is not negatively debarred
in the conveyance, she shall be deemed to have none except what is
positively given or reserved to her."
In the Holliday case the Court gives the reasons behind this rule by pointing
out (at 340) that, " . . . in Pennsylvania, this estate in equity was intended,
through her disabilities, to protect the feme covert not only from her own im-
providence, but also from the improvidence and importunity of her husband."
Thus, although the trust originated under conditions and for reasons which do not
necessarily exist today, it is nevertheless one of the recognized devices by which
voluntary and involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest is prohibited.
It should be noted that the trust remains in effect only so long as the coverture
exists,7 ' being terminated by the death of either spouse. It has been held that
divorce terminates the trust when consistent with the intent of the settlor."6 Once
terminated by divorce or by death of the husband, the trust does not reattach on
second marriage. 76
69Di Carlo v. Licini, 156 Pa. Super. 363 (1944); Holliday v. Hively, 198 Pa. 335 (1901).
7
OCarman v. Bumpas, 244 Pa. 136 (1914).
71See note 69.
7 2
McConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476 (1890).
78198 Pa. 335, 341 (1901).
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Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. 207 (1870).
7tFrey's Estate, 24 Pa. D & C Rep. 114 (1935).7
'Hammersley v. Smith, 4 Whart. 125 (1839).
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BLENDED TRUST
A blended trust may be defined as a trust which by its terms provides for
benefits to a group of persons so that the interest of one beneficiary is inseparable
from the interests of the others, with the result that a beneficiary cannot transfer his
interest nor can it be reached by his creditors.7
Thus, the very nature of a beneficiary's interest prevents its alienation because
it cannot be separated from the interests of the other beneficiaries in the group.
Also, the interest might be considered to be too indefinite to be the subject of
trarisfer by the beneficiary or attachment by creditors. But there seems to be no
reason why the entire beneficial interest cannot be alienated by group transfer or for
group debts.
Frequently when the settlor provides for a blending of the equitable interests,
he also combines the language of a support or discretionary trust,78 the result being
that the equitable interest is inalienable not only because it is inseparable but also
for reasons discussed above under support and discretionary trust headings.
OTHER POSSIBLE TRUST DEVICES
Personal Trust: This is a trust which by its terms provides that the bene-
ficiary's interest is of a personal character peculiar to the beneficiary, with the
result that the nature of the interest prevents it from being transferred by the
beneficiary or attached by his creditors.
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Since the Pennsylvania courts give liberal support and recognition to the
spendthrift trust and its variations and to the other trust devices discussed above,
certain other types of trusts frequently employed in other jurisdictions are appar-
ently infrequently employed in Pennsylvania because the desired r'esults can be
accomplished by other means. These trusts will be discussed briefly.
Solvency on Condition Precedent Trust: This is a trust which by its terms
provides that the beneficiary shall be entitled to receive the principal of the trust
property only upon his becoming financially solvent, with the result that his con-
tingent interest cannot be reached by his creditors or trustee in bankruptcy.80 This
restraint occurs because an involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest would
prevent a happening of the very condition upon which the beneficiary becomes
entitled to receive the benefit of the trust. However, this trust provision should
not prevent the beneficiary from voluntarily transferring his contingent interest.
The cases hold that after the beneficiary's debts are extinguished by a discharge in
bankruptcy his former creditors or trustee in bankruptcy cannot reach his interest.81
77 Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 161; 1 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 226.
7 SFoster's Estate, 179 Pa. 610 (1897).
7 9
Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 160; Slemmon's Estate, 173 Pa. 156 (1895).
8
Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 159; 1 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 220.
8Hull v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 245 U. S. 312, 38 S. Ct. 103 (1917) ; In re Manley's
Estate, 112 Vt. 314, 24 A2d 357 (1942).
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Divesting Trust: This is a trust which by its terms provides that the interest
of the beneficiary shall terminate upon an attempt by him to transfer it or by his
creditors to reach it or by his bankruptcy, with the result that the beneficiary's
interest will be divested upon any attempt of voluntary or involuntary alienation.8 2
Such provision for a divesting of the equitable interest is held valid by analogy to
a similar provision sometimes attached to legal life estates. Thus, courts have
held valid a trust provision for a gift over to occur on the attempted alienation of
the equitable interest of a life beneficiary, 83 or a provision that the interest of the
beneficiary shall terminate on his being adjudged a bankrupt.
8
Protective Trust: This is a trust which by its term provides that the interest
of the beneficiary shall terminate upon an attempt by him to transfer it or by his
creditors to reach it or by his bankruptcy, and another type trust such as a dis-
cretionary, support, blended, or combination thereof shall commence, the result
being that the beneficiary's interest will be divested upon any attempt of volun-
tary or involuntary alienation and another trust substituted in the place of the
original trust.8 5 In England the strong policy against restraints on alienations pre-
vents the use of most of the various trust devices discussed above. However, the
protective trust is sanctioned in England by statute which provides in effect that an
attempt to alienate the beneficiary's interest results in the creation of a discretion-
ary blended trust for the beneficiary and his family or other near relatives.8 6 Pro-
tective trusts are also occasionally found in the United States.
87
CONCLUSION
All through the law of property, including its ramifications into other branches
of the law such as trusts, the English and American courts have repeated the gen-
eral policy against restraints on alienation of real and personal property. But there
is also another principle which has been enunciated by the courts, that of up-
holding the donor's right of dominion over his property to dispose of it in any
manner he pleases, within reason. In England the policy against restraints on
alienation prevails over the latter principle in both courts of law and equity and
most of the various trust devices discussed above are held to be invalid. In America,
for the most part, the policy against restraints on alienation prevails in courts of
law but gives way in equity to the principle of upholding the donor's right of
dominion over his property to dispose of it in the manner he pleases, to the extent
of validating various trust devices which restrain alienation of the equitable in-
8 2
Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 150; 1 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 220.
8
3Garrison v. Garrison, (Mo.) 188 SW 2d 644 (1945).84
Miller v. Miller, (W. Va.) 31 SE 2d 844 (1944).
851 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 227.
861 Bogert, op. cit., Sec. 221; English Trustee Act 1925, Sec. 33.
8 TMorel v. Cornell, 234 Mass. 563, 125 NE 575 (1920).
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terest. This is particularly true in Pennsylvania where the spendthrift trust is
said to have been originated. The Pennsylvania cases repeatedly stress the view that
various trust devices preventing alienation of the beneficiary's interest are held
valid because of the court's desire to carry out the intent of the settlor of the
trust and not because of consideration for the beneficiary, with the possible ex-
ception of the sole and separate use trust. This view is obviously premised on the*
principle of upholding the donor's right of dominion over his property to dis-
pose of it in the manner he pleases.
It should be noted, however, that the trust devices preventing alienation of
the beneficiary's interest are not completely effective against claims of all creditors,
as was pointed out by mention of the important exceptions to the invulnerability
of the spendthrift trust. It can be strongly argued that these enumerated spend-
thrift trust exceptions are also applicable to some of the other trust devices, and
cases can probably be found that have so held. Thus, judging by the past, the
tendency in the future undoubtedly will be to extend these exceptions to the other
trust devices wherever feasible, as well as to enlarge the number of exceptions to
include more types of creditors deemed to have a highly equitable claim against
the beneficiary.
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